'Governing Propaganda?'
by Emma L Briant
Claims were once made about a
'democratic propaganda model' which protected the domestic media from
propaganda for the enemy (Snow & Taylor, 2006). While this was far from an
accurate description of 20th Century propaganda, since 9/11, mass surveillance
and the explosion of the internet, led UK and US government planners to argue
existing propaganda doctrine (and in the US, laws) were out-dated, standing in
their way. Traditional distinctions between propaganda for foreign audiences
- Public Diplomacy and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) - and propaganda for
the US public and international media - Public Affairs (PA) - were seen as
preventing effective propaganda at home and abroad.
Significant changes were pushed forward,
particularly since 2005:
· Use
of British - US propaganda exchange relationship (See Briant, 2015)
· In
US & UK propaganda 'streams' were increasingly coordinated ('strategic
communication') to ensure the messages would not contradict and to maintain
strategic control of messages for different audiences, particularly online in
counter-terrorism (See Gardiner, 2003; Miller, January 2004; Snow and Taylor,
2006; Briant 2015).
· Hybrid
forms of communication also developed such as US Military Information Support
Operations which emerged in 2010.
· The
US Smith-Mundt Act was amended in 2012 to allow Public Diplomacy media
previously restricted domestically to be disseminated within the US.
Informal and semi-formal networks were used for coordinating
activities to challenge formal 'restrictive' processes. One new example is the
Senior Information Operations Advisory Council which seeks to shape and
influence a better coordinated future US propaganda. Legally speaking, changes were more awkward to implement in the US than
in Britain due to British reliance on doctrine and US processes being legally enshrined. Britain
still relies on doctrine and doctrine is non-binding on practice. This led to a
situation where the UK was seen as 'useful' to the US due to its different
rules and lack of legal audience restrictions. Yet this and revelations from
Snowden also shows how easy it is for governments to evade national propaganda
rules using informal and formal international relations. Formal claims made by
doctrine have proven far from the reality of practice and in reality informal
struggles within the propaganda elite evolve and then embed new practices (Briant,
2015).
There is a lack of
recognition or awareness of the extent of recent changes in propaganda and what they mean among
journalists. Should this be further
embedded into journalism teaching? Journalists often perceive journalism as the
'solution' to propaganda and there is a failure to realise the changing government
propaganda playing field is not just 'more of the same'. This means 'better' journalism
may not be enough: In relation to intelligence and security, journalists are
always limited in their 4th estate role. Citizen journalism and sousveillance
also show limited potential to redress the balance and ensure 'equiveillance' and
accountability (Bakir, 2010). A possible balance of formal and informal governance of government
propaganda is an important area for us to
cover in this seminar.
While there is a need to deal with genuine online threats, security does not
excuse the trampling of accountability and democratic debate. The public and
media should demand real oversight that will ensure laws and rules are not a
sham. We need to ask: What are the limits
for government 'influence' or propaganda in a democracy? And revisit the debate over
territorial and other audience protections. Would
legislative change in the US/UK be desirable and what might this and/or other
solutions look like? This
may also rest on academics, activists, journalists and other concerned actors finding
new ways to organise for change.
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